Emotional arousal can both enhance and impair memory. Considering that both emotional memory and trait anxiety (TA) have been associated with adrenergic activity, the authors investigated whether there is an association between 2 opposite emotional memory biases and the TA. The authors used a procedure recently put forward by B. A. Strange, R. Hurlemann, and R. J. Dolan (2003) to elicit an emotion-induced retrograde amnesia (ERA) coupled to an emotional memory enhancement (EME). The authors contrasted the association between these emotional memory biases and the TA in several conditions involving different levels of encoding and types of recall. The results presented here indicated a significant interaction of the TA with EME and ERA and the dependency of these biases on the consciously controlled use of memory.
Recognition of the multifaceted relation between emotion and memory launched not only a thousand research ships but provided an intellectual basis for the modern cognitive psychology movement that integrated emotional "hot" cognitions (e.g., David, Miclea, & Opre, 2004; David, Schnur, & Belloiu, 2002) . Early influential studies such as those of Henri Piéron and Sigmund Freud argued that emotion predominantly reinforces memory, which led to the fossilization of this view in contemporary psychology (for a review, see Borod, 2000) . More recent research has shown that this theory is true but limited because there are cases when emotionality is associated not only with memory enhancements but also with memory decrements. Human participants usually remember better the emotionally arousing words or pictures than the neutral stimuli (Bradley, Greenwald, Petry, & Lang, 1992; LaBar & Phelps, 1998) . However, whereas there is a lasting vivid memory for the gist of an emotional event, the memory for the peripheral details of the same event proves decremented (Adolphs, Denburg, & Tranel, 2001) . Moreover, human participants are less likely to remember the details of an event if it comes before another emotionally arousing event that creates a state of "mental shock" (Christianson & Loftus, 1987; Christianson, Loftus, Hoffman, & Loftus, 1991; Loftus & Burns, 1982) . A topic related to the impairing influence of emotional arousal on memory has been independently approached by neuroscientists studying the involvement of the hypothalamo-pituitary system in stressinduced memory impairments (e.g., McGaugh & Roozendaal, 2002; Woodson, Macintosh, Fleshner, & Diamond, 2003) . The amnestic potential of emotional arousal has remained nonetheless rather poorly explored in mainstream cognitive psychology until recently (Strange et al., 2003) . We briefly describe below how several recent studies reopened this topic.
Psychologists have traditionally viewed anxiety as a variant of emotional arousal (see Easterbrook, 1959; Miclea, 2001) . Trait anxiety (TA) is a construct based on the assumption that even healthy individuals can differ from one another in their sensitivity to threat (Spielberger, 1983) . This individual difference is related to the innate sympathovagal balance, that is, the nonlinear feedback control exerted by the autonomic nervous system on heart rate and other physiological processes (e.g., LeBlanc, Ducharme, & Thompson, 2004; Maes et al., 2002; Mizuki, Suetsugi, Ushijima, & Yamada, 1996; Virtanen et al., 2003; Yu, Dimsdale, & Mills, 1999 ; for a review, see Kabbaj, 2004) . TA has been accordingly included in personality inventories (for reviews, see Opre, 2001; Zuckerman, 1991) . Participants high in TA display significantly longer solution times and lower accuracy scores for timelimited abstract reasoning tasks, and they usually obtain lower scores on Raven's Progressive Matrices (Leon & Revelle, 1985; Mandler & Sarason, 1952; Mayer, 1977; Siegman, 1956) . The anxious participants use fewer cues and are less selective in distinguishing task-relevant from task-irrelevant cues, particularly in difficult tasks (Easterbrook, 1959) . Another theory has asserted that anxious participants have self-rather than task-centered responses and engage in task interference rather than task completion responding (Mandler & Sarason, 1952) . However, neither theory is representative of the performance of persons who differ in their level of TA (Leon & Revelle, 1985) .
Several cognitive models of emotion have theorized that TA is associated with an attentional and memory bias for threat-related (worry) information because this type of stimuli relates more to the personal preoccupations of individuals high on this trait (Reidy & Richards, 1997a , 1997b ). The studies that tested this association on both clinical and nonclinical high-TA samples have obtained equivocal results (Reidy & Richards, 1997a , 1997b Richards & French, 1991) . Some authors have attributed the inconsistency of these results to the type of emotional stimuli used, which were not always relevant or specific to the form of anxiety under investigation (Reidy & Richards, 1997b) . In a recent study, Reidy (2004) hypothesized that the participants high in TA would display a memory bias for worry themes. The results of this study indicated that the low-TA group recalled significantly more nonworry than worry items, whereas the high-TA group recalled equivalent numbers of each type of item (Reidy, 2004) , thus invalidating the original prediction. Williams, Watts, MacLeod, and Mathews (1997) have independently suggested that anxiety should be primarily associated with an implicit memory bias because this type of memory specifically reflects the preattentional automatic processes that probably support the attentional biases demonstrated in anxiety. The empirical investigations of this hypothesis have also failed to offer univocal confirmations (see Russo, Fox, & Bowles, 1999) . However, to date, there is at least strong evidence that high-TA participants tend to choose a negative interpretation for threat-related information, particularly when it is self-relevant (e.g., Brendle & Wenzel, 2004; Burke & Mathews, 1992) .
It has also been acknowledged that the implicit and explicit memory biases for emotional information may represent two different styles of emotional processing (Oldenburg, Lundh, & Kivistö, 2002 ) that might discriminate between high and low TA. This theory has recently received some neurobiological confirmation-a study using functional MRI (fMRI) has shown that the conscious processing of fearful faces triggers the activation of the basolateral amygdala and that the magnitude of this local activation can be predicted by individual differences in the TA (Etkin et al., 2004) . It has also been hypothesized that a subgroup of individuals, customarily referred to as repressors, who score low on the TA but show considerable physiological or other behavioral signs of anxiety, display a tendency toward the selective processing of nonthreatening information (Eysenck, 1997) and process information at an explicit level rather than at an implicit level (Oldenburg et al., 2002) . Overall, there is a growing consensus that high-and low-TA participants differ in the organization of their emotional memory and the degree of elaboration given to worry and nonworry themes (Mellings & Alden, 2000; Reidy, 2004 ).
Several studies have tested the feasibility of combining cognitive and psychophysiological approaches to study the relationship between TA and the memory performance (Harrison & Turpin, 2003) . Heart rate is a good discriminator of orienting and defensive responses (Graham, 1997) . There is proof that young hypertensive participants score higher on TA than age-matched normotensive participants and perform more poorly on a variety of neuropsychological tests (Waldstein et al., 1996) . By measuring heart rate during implicit memory tasks in high-and low-TA participants, Harrison and Turpin (2003) found that those threat stimuli that were not correctly identified in a word stem completion task were associated, for all participants, with cardiac deceleration taken therein as indicative of the stimulus detection and orientation processes. The same study indicated a significant correlation between heart rate acceleration and increased skin conductance response amplitude and the processing of those nonthreat stimuli that the participants have correctly identified in a subsequent stemcompletion task (Harrison & Turpin, 2003) . The authors of this study interpreted these latter indices as reflecting the memory consolidation of nonthreatening stimuli. We have also shown that TA predicted the magnitude of the R-R intervals (intervals between ventricular depolarizations) from the electrocardiogram of participants while they were engaged in a time-limited abstract reasoning task (Miu et al., 2003) .
A recent study has established a new experimental procedure promoting both memory-enhancing and impairing effects attributable to emotional arousal (Strange et al., 2003; for commentary see Cahill, 2003) . By presenting lists of semantically related, emotionally neutral nouns interspersed with emotional, perceptual, and semantic "oddballs," Strange et al. (2003) showed that their participants recalled the emotional items (E) significantly better than the neutral ones, in contrast with the items immediately preceding the E (E-1 items), which were recalled at a significantly worse rate than the neutral items. The procedure proved to be advantageous because it made it possible to elicit simultaneously two opposite emotional memory biases, that is, an emotion-induced memory enhancement (EME) and an emotion-induced retrograde amnesia (ERA) by the same procedure. At the same time, this study has challenged a recalibration of emotional memory paradigms because, in contrast to some previous studies, it involved short-term memory processes and far less arousing stimuli than were typically used in the studies of long-term memory on humans (for a review, see Cahill, 2003; Packard & Cahill, 2001) . fMRI studies have indicated that both the EME for the E items and the ERA affecting the E-1 items depend on the beta-adrenergic modulation of amygdala activity during encoding and on hippocampal activation during retrieval (Strange & Dolan, 2004; Strange et al., 2003 ; see also Kensinger & Corkin, 2004) . It is thus not surprising that similar experimental effects were shown to be reversed by beta-adrenergic inhibitors (Cahill, Prins, Weber, & McGaugh, 1994; Strange & Dolan, 2004; Strange et al., 2003 ; see also Cahill & van Stegeren, 2003; O'Carroll, Drysdale, Cahill, Shajahan, & Ebmeier, 1999; van Stegeren, Everaerd, & Gooren, 2002) and abolished by selective bilateral amygdala damage (Strange et al., 2003) .
The adrenergic dependency of both EME and ERA, as well as TA, prompted us to explore the possibility of an association among these variables. We used the procedure originally proposed by Strange et al. (2003) to test this hypothesis and to study the interaction of EME and ERA with the level of encoding (see Craik & Lockhart, 1972) and the type of recall (free or cued recall, immediate or delayed; see Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1988; Weiskrantz, 1990 ).
Method

Participants
An initial cohort of 94 Babeş-Bolyai University undergraduate students agreed to be screened for the study. We retained for further study 33 participants (25 women and 8 men) who met inclusion criteria (see Materials and Procedure). All participants gave informed consent, and each participant received course credit for his or her participation. All participants were free of neurological or psychiatric history. The design and the procedure of the study were in accordance with the institutional guidelines and the international prescriptions for studies with human participants.
Materials and Procedure
We used the Trait Anxiety Autoevaluation Questionnaire, Form B (TAAQ; Spielberger, 1966) , translated into Romanian and adapted for the Romanian population (Pitariu & Albu, 1996; Pitariu, Miclea, & Munteanu, 1987) , and the Zuckerman-Kuhlman Personality Questionnaire Form III (ZKPQ; Zuckerman, Kuhlman, Joireman, Teta, & Kraft, 1993) , also translated into Romanian and adapted for the Romanian population (Opre, Kiss, & Opre, 2003) . Only participants (N ϭ 33) with scores Ն1 standard deviation above (high responders) or below average (low responders) on the TAAQ and the Neuroticism/Anxiety scale of ZKPQ were selected for this study (see Table 1 ). We tried to balance the sample for the TA across genders, that is, 25% (N ϭ 2) of men were low responders, and 75% were high responders (N ϭ 6), whereas 24% (N ϭ 6) of women were low responders and 76% were high responders (N ϭ 19). The correlation between the anxiety scores on TAAQ and ZKPQ of the participants included in our sample was r ϭ .84, p Ͻ .01.
The stimuli consisted of 9 lists of 18 semantically related nouns selected using the Edinburgh Association Thesaurus 1 that were translated into Romanian and renormalized for semantic associability by an independent group (N ϭ 10) in a double-blind manner. The procedure was adapted from Strange et al. (2003) . Essentially, the lists were displayed on a computer screen, written in lowercase, at a rate of one per second, with each stimulus presented for 3 s (see Figure 1A , for examples). Each list included the following: (a) 16 control nouns of the same semantic category that were emotionally neutral and were all presented in the same font; (b) one perceptual oddball (P) that was presented in a novel font but was emotionally neutral and from the same semantic category as the control nouns; (c) one emotional oddball (E) that was of the same semantic category and perceptually identical to the control nouns but had been rated as an emotional stimulus. All the E items were standardized for arousal value (arousing, nonarousing) and emotional valence (positive or negative) by the same independent group that we used to normalize the semantic relatedness of the control nouns. The P or the E never occurred among the first or last five nouns to prevent the contamination of data with primacy or recency effects. The lists were presented in four sessions, with the words "New List" presented between lists. Nouns were presented in Times font (yellow on black), except for the P nouns, which were presented in different fonts (see Figure 1A) .
Participants engaged in two distinct encoding tasks, either a shallow encoding task (two sessions), which involved indicating whether the first letter in the noun had an enclosed space, or a deep encoding task (two sessions), which involved indicating whether the noun described a living or a nonliving entity. The order of the encoding instructions was counterbalanced. The memory for the presented nouns was assessed in three ways: (a) an immediate written free-recall task after the presentation of each of the 18-noun lists (Day 1); (b) an immediate written cued-recall task, also following the presentation of each of the 18-noun lists (Day 1); the lists consisted of 40 word stems (20 stems of new words and 20 stems of the target words), and the participant was instructed to complete the stems either with the words that he or she recalled from the target list or with the first word that came to mind; (c) a 24 hr-delayed written cued-recall task for the items from the last list presented in Day 1, without a specific manipulation of the level of encoding (i.e., the participants were simply told to read the words presented in the list). After the first day with the former two types of memory tests, the participants were discouraged to rehearse the nouns and were simply instructed to come back in the morning for an independent interview (for an overview of the experimental design, see Figure 1B ). All participants reported that they had slept at least 7 hr during the previous night. The cued recall task was designed as an "inclusion" condition taken from the process-dissociation procedure of Toth, Reingold, and Jacoby (1994) . In contrast to the free-recall task, which was a direct test of explicit memory in which consciously controlled uses of memory were dominant, both automatic and controlled uses of memory were evaluated together in the cued-recall task as a result of the inclusion instruction (for arguments, see Toth et al., 1994) . The level-of-processing effect has been known to influence both the automatic and the controlled uses of memory, so it seemed reasonable to test the effect of this variable in both conditions.
We calculated the probability of recall of the target items relative to two randomly selected control nouns chosen from the middle of the list. Presenting the data as percentage recall relative to control nouns facilitated comparison with the Strange et al. (2003) data. We report all the data here as the mean Ϯ standard error of the mean (SEM). The statistical analysis included analysis of variance (ANOVA), followed by post hoc comparison tests or paired Student t tests. We set the threshold of statistical significance at p Յ .05.
Results
We first checked whether our data supported the report of Strange et al. (2003) . Figure 2 shows the percentage of recalled items relative to neutral items, and it is easily comparable to Strange, Hurlemann, and Dolan's Figure 2 (see Strange et al., 2003, p. 13627) . The E nouns were indeed recalled generally better than the neutral nouns in all three experimental conditions, that is, in the immediate free recall (Figure 2A ), the cued recall task (Figure 2A) , and the delayed cued recall task ( Figure 2C ). In contrast, the participants recalled the E Ϫ 1, but not the E ϩ 1 nouns, worse than the neutral nouns, displaying similar memory decrements across all of the experimental conditions. The participants recalled the P nouns better in the free-recall and delayed cued-recall conditions, but not in the immediate cued-recall condition. The probability of recalling the P Ϫ 1 nouns across conditions was not significantly different relative to the neutral or the P nouns. We concluded that the procedure succeeded in inducing a memory-enhancing effect for the E items and a memorysuppressive effect for the E Ϫ 1 items.
A 2 (anxiety: high vs. low responders) ϫ 2 (encoding condition: shallow vs. deep) ϫ 2 (oddball: emotional vs. perceptual) ϫ 3 (position: oddball minus 1 vs. oddball vs. oddball plus 1) ANOVA indicated significant main effects of position, F(8, 32) ϭ 6.68, p Ͻ .01, and oddball, F(5, 32) ϭ 3.13, p Ͻ .05. EME and ERA were thus attributable to emotional arousal that biased the memory for the E and E Ϫ 1 items only.
TA interacted with the variables supporting EME and ERA. An ANOVA indicated significant Anxiety ϫ Position, F(8, 32) ϭ 3.39, p Ͻ .01, Anxiety ϫ Encoding Condition, F(3, 32) ϭ 3.44, p Ͻ .02, and Anxiety ϫ Oddball, F(5, 32) ϭ 4.12, p Ͻ .01, interactions. That is, EME and ERA had different magnitudes for the high responders versus the low responders.
We also examined the interaction of the other factors of ZKPQ (see Table 1 ) with the emotional memory-related variables (e.g., 1 The thesaurus is available online at http://www.eat.rl.ac.uk. Note. TAAQ ϭ Trait Anxiety Autoevaluation Questionnaire, Form B (Spielberger, 1966) ; ZKPQ ϭ Zuckerman-Kuhlman Personality Questionnaire Form III. ZKPQ includes an infrequency scale which suggests either inattention to the content of the items and acquiescence or a very strong social desirability set (Zuckerman et al., 1993) . All the participants who scored above 3 on this scale were excluded from the analyses.
oddball, position). An ANOVA indicated an intriguing effect of Position ϫ Sociability, F(2, 32) ϭ 3.93, p Ͻ .03. Next we investigated the effects of the type of recall and the level of processing. In the shallow encoding condition, when the participants completed a free-recall task immediately after the presentation of the target list, the E Ϫ 1 items were recalled significantly worse than the neutral and the E items, t(32) ϭ Ϫ8.71, p Ͻ .01; mean percentage of recalled control items Ϯ SEM ϭ 13.63 Ϯ 2.68. However, within a similar shallow encoding condition, when the participants were supposed to complete a list of word stems immediately after the presentation of the target list, both memory effects were less obvious (mean percentage of recalled control items Ϯ SEM ϭ 25.75 Ϯ 4.28). The ERA effect was thus mostly dependent on the consciously controlled use of memory. The relationship between TA and the EME effect in the immediate free-and cued-recall tasks was not straightforward. As expected, the high responders recalled more E items than did the low responders in the free-recall task, whereas the situation reversed in the shallow encoding immediate cued-recall condition.
In the deep encoding condition, when the participants engaged in the immediate free-recall task, a ceiling effect obscured EME and ERA because the participants generally recalled more neutral items than in the shallow condition (mean percentage of recalled control items Ϯ SEM ϭ 32.57 Ϯ 4.67), with the observation that we analyzed the recall performance for the E and E Ϫ 1 items relative to two randomly selected neutral (control) nouns, chosen from the middle of the list. In a similar way, in the deep encoding condition immediately followed by a cued-recall task, EME was probably obscured again by a ceiling effect (mean percentage of recalled control items Ϯ SEM ϭ 43.18 Ϯ 3.12). We found strong ERA effects in the immediate cued-recall task, recall of E Ϫ 1 vs. E and control nouns: t(32) ϭ Ϫ5.29, p Ͻ .01, and the delayed cued-recall task, recall of E Ϫ 1 vs. E and control nouns: t(32) ϭ Ϫ5.79, p Ͻ .01. However, the magnitude of this effect was lower in the deep encoding immediate cued-recall condition than in the shallow encoding immediate free-recall condition (see the scale of the ordinate on Figures 2A and 2C) .
The ceiling effect was no longer present in the delayed cuedrecall task, probably because the participants had forgotten most of the control items and this situation allowed the development of EME and ERA. The probability of recall of the E ϩ 1 items was not significantly different compared with the control items and the E items across the type of recall and the level-of-processing conditions. As mentioned above, there was a significant ERA, although this was not coupled to an emotion-induced memory enhancement effect. We concluded that ERA survived consolidation, with reasonable doubts supported by the decoupling of the ERA-like effect that we observed in the delayed cued-recall condition from an EME, and the limits in controlling the variables affecting the consolidation processes in our experiment.
There was a possibility that the EME and ERA found in our study were attributable to indices that were independent of TA, such as gender. There were indeed more women (approx. 75%) than men (approx. 25%) in our sample and, as expected, the women from our sample obtained higher scores on both of the TA measures (see Table 1 ). Among the whole sample, there were significant interactions of gender in the immediate free-recall, F(6, 32) ϭ 6.93, p Ͻ .01 and cued-recall, F(6, 32) ϭ 4.59, p Ͻ .03 conditions. The magnitude of the ERA effect was higher for women than for men, although it reached statistical significance only in the deep encoding immediate cued-recall condition, t(31) ϭ Ϫ2.1, p Ͻ .04. However, the general tendency of the recall of the E Ϫ 1 items reported here supported the conclusion of Strange et al. (2003) that gender was a moderator of ERA.
We verified whether EME and ERA could be observed if we excluded the (fewer) men and maintained only the women from our sample in the analysis, thus, controlling for gender. An ANOVA showed that there were significant main effects of position, F(8, 24) ϭ 8.66, p Ͻ .01, and oddball, F(5, 24) ϭ 4.1, p Ͻ .01, and significant Anxiety ϫ Position, F(8, 24) ϭ 3.29, p Ͻ .01, Anxiety ϫ Encoding Condition, F(3, 24) ϭ 3.1, p Ͻ .04, and Anxiety ϫ Oddball, F(5, 24) ϭ 3.91, p Ͻ .01, interactions. Whereas among the whole sample, the sociability scores from the ZKPQ interacted significantly with the position variable, we found a significant interaction of sociability with the oddball variable, F(5, 24) ϭ 10.85, p Ͻ .01, in the women subsample. The results of our statistical analysis based on the whole sample were replicated therefore on a single gender sample and confirmed that the EME and ERA effects reported in this study were reliably attributable to TA. It seemed that gender and TA were moderating EME and ERA independently.
Discussion
Considering that several studies have related TA as well as EME and ERA to adrenergic activity, we sought to find out whether there was an association between TA and these emotional memory effects, with a procedure originally put forward by Strange et al. (2003) . We used this procedure in several experimental conditions that allowed us to explore the psychological mechanisms that supported EME and ERA of the kind observed in this study. We briefly discuss our findings below.
We report here data indicating that the "double-edge" procedure of Strange et al. (2003) reliably elicits emotion-induced memoryenhancing and memory-impairing effects (for commentary see Cahill, 2003) . The present study confirmed that the mere exposure of participants to emotionally arousing words promoted an emotional arousal that was sufficient to enhance memory for those particular emotional words and to suppress memory for words immediately preceding them. Strange and Dolan (2004) have used the same psychological procedure coupled with fMRI to show that these emotional memory effects depend on amygdala activity during the encoding. Other studies have extensively shown that the central noradrenaline release in the amygdala during the encoding of emotional stimuli is indeed critical to the subsequent recall of these stimuli (e.g., Cahill et al., 1996 Cahill et al., , 2001 Cahill & McGaugh, 1998; Cahill et al., 1994; Cahill, Uncapher, Kilpatrick, Alkire, & Turner, 2004; Cahill & van Stegeren, 2003; O'Carroll et al., 1999; Roozendaal & McGaugh, 1996a , 1996b van Stegeren, Everaerd, & Gooren, 2002 ; for reviews see Hamann, 2001; McGaugh, 2004) . However, noradrenaline is probably just one component of the neurotransmitter cocktail released at this site during encoding because this structure is a more complex neuromodulatory interface (Gold, Hankins, Edwards, Chester, & McGaugh, 1975; Roozendaal, de Quervain, Schelling, & McGaugh, 2004) . Whereas Strange et al. (2003, pp. 13626 ) noted that at the time nothing was known regarding the neurobiological processes accounting for emotion-induced impairments, it has recently been suggested that long-term potentiation might represent a cellular mechanism for both memory facilitation and suppression of fearrelated memories (Diamond, Park, & Woodson, 2004) .
We found that TA interacted with the variables supporting the EME and ERA observed in our study. That is, TA interacted significantly with the position (oddball minus 1, oddball, oddball ϩ 1) and type (emotional, perceptual) of oddball and with the level of encoding (shallow, deep). Whereas the first two significant interactions involving TA emphasized that this trait is a moderator of EME and ERA, the interpretation of the third interaction extends beyond the present study. We note, however, that Strange, Hurlemann, and Dolan (2003) processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) on ERA and concluded that this variable had no main effect. This was the reason why these authors used only a shallow encoding condition in their subsequent pharmacological and neuropsychological experiments. We also tested the influence of the level of encoding on EME and ERA, and, as mentioned earlier, we confirmed that there was no main effect of the level of encoding but that there was nonetheless a significant interaction of this variable with TA. Considering that high TA has been associated with an attentional bias toward emotionally arousing stimuli and a tendency to consciously elaborate more on these stimuli (e.g., Williams et al., 1997; Reidy, 2004) , we conjecture that these correlates might explain why it is that only by distinguishing participants on the basis of TA can one notice an effect of the level of encoding on emotional memory. It is otherwise strange why an encoding manipulation such as level of processing would have no effect on the EME and ERA elicited by a procedure exclusively relying on encoding instructions (Cahill, 2003) . Finally, our results allowed us to conclude that TA was a moderator of the association between central adrenergic activity and emotional memory, which acted independently of gender.
Another new finding of this study indicated that ERA depended on the consciously controlled use of memory. This effect was obvious in the shallow encoding free-recall condition but became obscured in the shallow encoding cued-recall condition. The instruction used in the latter condition elicited both the automatic and the consciously controlled use of memory, as argued by Toth et al. (1994; see also Domuþa & Creþiu, 2002) . The cued-recall condition thus targeted an explicit memory performance "contaminated" by automatic processes and indicated that ERA depended mostly on the consciously controlled use of memory. This use of memory probably favored this effect because it allowed the activation of the previous elaborations on the emotional stimulus and thus maintained the attentional bias toward E and detrimental to E Ϫ 1. In the shallow encoding free-recall condition, the consciously controlled use of memory favored even the EME that is typically more robust than the ERA. However, the cued-recall condition was informative. We observed that the memory performance of high responders decremented most of all in the shallow encoding cued-recall condition. This fact might indicate that the emotional memory performance of high responders who display a tendency to elaborate more on emotionally arousing stimuli depend more than that of the low responders on the possibility to reactivate their previous elaborations on the emotional stimuli through the consciously controlled use of memory.
An important issue was to establish whether the ERA survived consolidation (see Cahill, 2003) . We observed an ERA effect in the delayed cued recall. This could indicate that this effect survived the long-term consolidation. However, because this effect was not coupled to an EME effect, we could not rule out the possibility that the difference between the recall of the E-1 and the E items was determined by the passive decrement of these two types of items during delay that simply happened to be in favor of the E items.
In conclusion, we highlight that the data we report in this study support the view in which EME and ERA depend on the adrenergic modulation of the amygdala during encoding. TA is a moderator of emotional memory and probably reflects the dependency of EME and ERA on the central adrenergic modulation. Although ERA might seem soaked in adrenalin, the attentional and memory mechanisms that support this experimental effect are promising and should tell us more in the future about the nature of forgetting.
